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   Developed countries (DCs) are wealthy because they exploit less developed 
countries (LDCs), buying their raw materials, including energy and minerals, 
at bargain prices. LDCs are less developed because the prices of their raw 
materials are kept at an exorbitantly low level by the DCs. This Marxist dogma 
in recent years has gained credence in wide circles.  In several DCs, among them 
Sweden, massmedia have a Marxist bias that in no way reflects the Marxist posi-
tion in the electorate. Massmedia people with a Marxist  jargon have been 
conspicuous in media with a strong impact on public opinion, primarily TV and 
newspapers with a large circulation. 
   The exploitation credo is not limited to Sweden and other DCs as testified by 
any number of political statements by leaders of LDCs, some of which in 1975 might 
better be termed newly-rich nations. These politicians often had their education 
at European or American universities in close contact with the radical debate of 
the day. 
   Is the exploitation credo true or  false  ? The answer should be found in the 
border area between economic and political geography. In market economies 
almost all international business transactions are made by business firms, as a rule 
privately owned but sometimes with a controlling government interest. However, 
firms with a large or controlling government ownership  (e.g. the British oil company 
BP or the French automobile-manufacturing group Renault) do not act differently 
from those which are completely in the private domain. Business firms vary 
considerably measured by the role international transactions play in their total 
turnover. Some are pure domestic firms, others import rawmaterials, parts and 
components and sell some of their output abroad and a third group not only trade 
with partners abroad but also manufacture outside their home country. They are 
the multinational corporations (MCs) for whom exports and imports may be 
transactions between subsidiaries of the same group. 
   The business firm is the agent in economic geography. Survival and longterm 
growth are the two major goals of the business firm. Exploitation of foreigners 
cannot be a goal  per se. Such exploitation must take the form of underpayment of 
foreign employees, charging customers too much or paying suppliers too little. 
It seems legitimate to assume that subsidiaries of MCs in accordance with their 
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two major goals follow the rules laid down by the host governments. MCs will 
have to pay at least market wages and salaries and charge or pay market prices. 
   Since many MCs in small LDCs are monopolies, it should be reasonable to 
assume that they may charge too much for their products or, which is our primary 
concern in this paper, pay too little for their raw materials. But the blame 
should then be put on the host government for having too lax anti-trust legislation, 
not on the company for following the rules of monopoly pricing. Political 
geography does not enter this  example: it would be difficult to find an instance in 
which a home country of a MC has tried to prevent a host country of a subsidiary 
from enforcing anti-trust laws. 
Rawmaterials and political geography. Political geography or geopolitics 
deals with the geography of power:') in focus is the state and its relations to other 
stages seen from a geographical point of view. Modern textbooks in political 
geography agree about the core of the subject. But in an IGU Bulletin (1974:2) 
the International Geographical Union states that political geography lacks focus. 
   The statement of the IGU seems strange at a time when one of the reasons for 
the 1973 oil crisis and all its disrupting consequences was the lack of geopolitical 
analysis in the oil-importing as well as the oil-exporting  countries. Events after 
October 1973 indicate that all countries  had too few practitioners of the geopolitical 
 art.2) 
   It is an important task of the government in a modern state to guarantee a 
steady and uninterrupted flow of energy to the various sectors of its economy. 
Market economy countries find it natural to let private, cooperative and state 
groups in competition organize this flow. But it is an intrinsic right of the state 
to formulate the rules of the game, to develop an energy policy just as of old it has 
had an agricultural policy. Energy corporations as well as energy consumers 
look to the state for an enunciated policy for the supply of energy. The lack of a 
stated policy must be interpreted as a  laissez-faire-policy. Such a course of 
inaction was typical for most industrial countries during the twenty-year-period 
before 1973. Deviations were rather small: the American import quotas for oil to 
  1) Power is vested in the government who promulgates and enforces laws and may wage 
     war. Individuals or business firms have no such rights but a large business firm may 
     have much economic influence (sometimes called power) and a great philosophermay 
     have much social or religious influence (also called power). The concept is here used 
      exclusively in the first sense. 
  2) In hindsight, the success of OPEC in 1973 may turn out as a Pyrrhic victory. The 
      oil-exporting countries lost large parts of their markets when exploration for oil was 
     rushed in other parts of the world, nuclear power projects got a hike and energy saving 
      techniques were pushed. The cost to the oil-importing countries were  tremendous: 
     two-digit inflation, the largest postwar unemployment and a precariousbalance of 
      payment situation.
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protect domestic production of energy and socially motivated discrimination of oil 
imports into several countries in Western Europe to protect the coal miners from 
too rapid decline in the number of  jobs were the best known examples. The 
 laissez-faire-policy led to low and decreasing energy prices, not the least in 
extreme free-trade countries like Japan, Italy and Sweden. It also led to vast 
profits in countries with low production costs (high land rent), primarily the 
countries of the Persian Gulf-region where the geological structures are exceedingly 
 favorable and the average oil well produces several hundred times as much as the 
average American well. Towards the end of the period Japan and Western 
Europe for the first time in history had lower energy prices than United States. 
The  laissez-faire-policy led to extreme vulnerability as demonstrated when the 
cartel of the exporting countries applied reckless monopoly pricing. 
   The paragraphs above should not be seen as a plea for a nationalistic economic 
policy. The state should guarantee an uninterrupted flow of energy even in times 
of crisis but it should not necessarily encourage energy production within its own 
borders. Oil-importing countries in regional cooperation with other oil-importing 
states should ensure that they are not too dependent on one oil-exporting region or one 
energy-exporting cartel. The  laissez-faire-policy may lead to low energy prices in 
the short-run but at the risk of disruptions and high prices in the longer perspective. 
   The economic and geographical deliberations of the integrated production 
and distribution groups should lead to a concentration of oil production to the 
regions with the lowest production costs. This was what happened in the 
twenty-year period before October 1973. The Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), formed in 1960, had not yet started to function as a multi-
state monopoly of the leading petroleum exporting countries. It was still a typical 
pressure groups.3) The integrated multinational oil corporations wanted to produce 
  3) OPEC became a multistate monopoly when unilaterally it raised the price of oil 
     above the global marginal cost of producing oil. Before that, the profits accruingto
     the exporting countries, being divided between the state and the oil-producing 
      company, were land rent bestowed on these countries by nature. After that, the oil-
     exporting nations made the citizens of the oil-importing countries pay an additional 
      monopoly tax. 
     Variationsin land rent from one oil district to another is a matter of indifference to the 
      oil consumer but are of great importance to the oil-producing countries and regions. 
      Monopoly taxes on the other hand, whatever their size, are unacceptable for the con-
      sumer and for the importing countries. No modern country can be expected in the 
      long run to accept that its citizens are forced to pay tax to another country. Such 
      tributes were sometimes paid in the past. In the distant past, countries in Asiapaid 
     tributes to the Emperor of China and in the more recent past countries of Europe, 
      including Sweden, paid tributes to the Sultan of Morocco. 
      With a multistate monopoly among leading exporting countries the supply of oil 
      becomes a concern of political geography in the importing countries and not primarily
      an affair of economic geography.
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Stone, sand and gravel 
Sulphur etc. 
Natural abrasives 
Other crude minerals 
Iron ore, concentrates 
Iron and steel scrap 
Nonfer base metal ore, concentrates 
Nonfer metal scrap 
Silver and platinum ores 
Uranium, thorium ore,  conc. 
Coal, coke, briquettes 
Crude petroleum, etc. 
Petroleum products 
Gas, natural and manufactured 
Pig iron, ferroalloys etc. 
Iron, steel primary forms 
Iron and steel shapes 
Iron, steel  univ, plate, sheet 
Iron, steel hoop, strip 
Railway rails etc. iron, steel 
Iron, steel wire excl. wire rod 
Iron, steel tubes, pipes etc. 
Iron, steel castings unworked 
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    Source: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics  1972-1973. 
as much as possible in the low-cost areas and as little as possible in the high-cost 
areas. 
   History has proved oil men to be far from the omniscient people assumed by 
economic  theory: instead of starting oil production in the best area and from 
there proceeding to less and less  favorable districts they have done the opposite 
which is true also of other mineral producers. The oil producers started in the 
high-cost Ohio River Valley of the United States (1859) and not in extremely low-
cost Saudi Arabia (1932). The former is the home area of leading multinational 
oil corporations (the Standard Oil groups and Gulf), the latter is a typical host
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area of multinational corporations but no such groups were born there. 
    It is reasonable to give consumption primacy over production. Production 
occurs to satisfy consumption needs and not the reverse. Likewise the state has 
primacy over the business firm. The state can take over the firm but not the 
opposite. It is logical to assume that the geopolitical deliberations of the 
importing countries are the key to future oil production patterns and oil trade 
flows. Any disturbance in the delicate balance of a  laissez-faire-situation should 
lead to a search for imports from alternative regions. 
    Recommendations for cooperation among the oil-importing countries had not 
been lacking before October 1973. Writers on the economics and geography of oil, 
like Peter Odell, M.A. Adelman and Walter J. Levy had come out in favor of such 
cooperation. The initiative was taken by the United States after the Arab oil 
embargo was imposed in 1973. The International Energy Agency  (IEA) was formed 
in February 1974 and a year later had 18 member  countries: Anglo-America, 
EEC except France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden , Switzerland 
and Turkey. Its staff is attached to the headquarters of the OECD in Paris . The 
agency has established an oil-sharing plan. Members have pledged a 10-percent 
reduction in oil imports. Next on the agenda is an oil floor-price which should be 
a sine qua non for oil-importing countries that have faced an embargo on oil 
exports and drastic monopoly pricing by a multistate monopoly. A guaranteed 
price is a necessity for all decision makers facing investment decisions in alternative 
petroleum producing areas as well in alternative energy forms. 
Petroleum and other minerals. The oil crisis starting in October 1973 probably 
marks the end of  laissez-faire-policy in the international petroleum trade . The 
global marginal cost for petroleum production was never allowed to play its full 
role but the continuous decline in real petroleum prices in the twenty years before 
1970 indicates a strong trend in that direction . New low-cost producing wells in 
new countries were opened faster than required by the increase in demand . High-
cost wells in old oil-producing countries were capped or protected , as for instance 
by the import quotas of the United States. Restrictions in the free trade of oil 
were a result of government intervention in the oil-importing countries , as already 
mentioned, not of oligopolistic actions by the oil corporations . 
   A few integrated multinational oil corporations , 'the seven sisters', are often 
alleged to have control of the flow of oil from the well to the gasoline station around 
corner. But it is hardly fair to describe the oil market as an oligopoly. In many 
countries domestic oil corporations have long been competing with the seven giants. 
In the United States, where domestic oil production has always by far exceeded 
net imports of oil, the seven sisters in no way dominate the market. In Sweden,
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one of many industrial countries with no domestic oil production, the seven sisters 
have competition from national oil companies that either import crude for their 
refineries or import products. Russian oil and oil from American independents 
have long been competing with oil from the large integrated corporations as 
sources of supply in the spot market for small domestic oil companies. 
   The search for oil in distant countries under trying conditions was no 
string of success stories in the early part of the century as evidenced by the 
development in Latin America, especially Venezuela, before 1930. Oil companies 
going into the Middle East in the 1930s had a hard time finding partners willing 
to share the financial risks. But the great success of several consortia in this 
area attracted many companies to new oil regions opened up in the 1950s and later. 
In the early 1970s well over a hundred companies were participating in consortia 
searching for oil in the North Sea. 
   Petroleum and petroleum products dominate international trade in tonnage. 
By value they account for over one-third of international trade in minerals. By 
comparison other minerals are small. 
   The iron and steel industry, the aluminium industry and the copper industry 
are other  major examples of mineral processing industries. All differ from each 
other and from the petroleum industry in geographic location, business structure, 
pricing and raw material policy. 
   The iron and steel industry has traditionally been national in scope. 
Administered prices are typical for steelworks turning out a host of semi-manufac-
tured products, the leading raw materials of the large engineering industry. 
Oligopoly under close observation from the government's anti-trust-agency is 
typical of the steel industry in most industrial countries. Steel corporations 
obtain their iron  are and coking coal from mining subsidiaries or buy them in the 
market on long-term or short-term contracts. American steel groups early 
integrated backwards and acquired domestic as well as foreign  are mines. The 
acquisition by Bethlehem Steel of iron  are mines in Chile before the First World 
War was an early example of a post-World-War II trend when American steel 
groups became involved in the development of new  are fields in Venezuela, Labrador, 
Liberia and elsewhere. American mining interests went abroad when it became 
obvious that the dominating high-grade ores near Lake Superior would soon be 
exhausted. The low-grade taconite ores were more expensive to mine. 
   The competitive position of domestic and foreign ores have shifted in the 
United States. The revolutionary increase in the size of ocean-going bulk carriers 
after 1955 tilted the scales in favor of foreign ores; the recent opening of a large 
lock in the Soo Canals between Lake Superior and Lake Michigan doubles the 
size of lake carriers (to more than 56 000 dwt) that bring taconite pellets from Lake
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Superior ports to the steel centers along the lower lakes which substantially 
improves the competitive situation of taconite. American mines abroad have 
been either fully owned by a steel subsidiary (e.g. the recently nationalized mines 
in Venezuela, owned by US Steel and Bethlehem) or operated as joint ventures with 
foreign mining companies (Bethlehem and Granges in the Lamco-project in 
 Liberia). 
   The remarkably expansive Japanese steel industry has organized its  are (and 
coking coal) supply by writing long-term contracts with consortia incorporating a 
large number of companies. The Pilbara region of northern Western Australia, 
which is rapidly becoming the world's leading iron  are exporting district, may 
serve as an example. In a typical consortium some Australian companies, often 
with no previous experience in mining, provide finance and local strings, one or more 
American companies contribute technical, managerial and financial expertise and 
often one or more Japanese companies provide market connections and finance, 
the key to this type of development are the long-term contracts. More recently 
Australian mines have shipped iron  are and coking coal also to Europe. 
   The aluminium industry is global in scope and controlled by fewer corporations 
than the petroleum industry of the 1950s. Administered prices and oligopoly are 
typical. The industry is integrated from the bauxite mine to the aluminium 
refinery which produces raw materials for the engineering industry. The copper 
industry is also global in scope and controlled by a few large corporations . In 
addition, it has few buyers. In spite of this, prices are fluctuating strongly. 
International trade in minerals. The table reveales that the 1970 international 
trade in minerals primarily was trade between the DCs. The LDCs with  2/3 
of the world's population and 4/7 of its land surface accounted for less than  1/7 of 
its imports of minerals and for  4/9 of its exports. Almost 3/4 of the exports of 
these SITC-groups from the LDCs were petroleum and petroleum products. The 
oil exports to an overwhelming extent originated in a few countries, most of them 
around the Persian Gulf. Measured by their  GNP/capita some of these countries 
did not belong to the group of poor countries but were high up at the other end of 
the scale. 
   The two maps showing the imports of minerals in 1970 to the United States 
and Japan reveal the same pattern. The two countries were almost equal buyers 
of minerals and together accounted for  2/7 of the mineral imports into the DCs. 
The maps refer to the same SITC-groups as the table and were based on national 
trade statistics. 
   For comparison, maps were drawn of the populations and land surfaces of 
the countries in the world. The symbol scales on the four maps were chosen to
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facilitate comparison. The total symbol surface is the same on all maps which 
means that e.g. 0,  1%,  1% or 10% of the world total is represented by the same 
symbol-sizes on all maps. This permits direct comparison of quantities expressed 
in US dollars, inhabitants or square kilometers. 
   United States in 1970 imported as much minerals from Canada as from the 
whole of Latin America and Africa combined. Japan accounted for more than the 
rest of Asia, including the Persian Gulf region. Several countries in Europe 
exported more minerals to the United States than Chile, a nation in which the 
'exploitation' issue was hotly debated in the 1960s. The country in the fall of 
1970 got a Marxist government4) which was ousted in 1973. Like many other 
metals, copper can be obtained from low-grade ores in the DCs or from high-grade 
ores in the LDCs. In all its uses copper has substitutes. The bargaining power of 
the LDCs is therefore weak. Since many metals are classified as strategic, several 
DCs, among them the United States, have built stockpiles for an emergency. The 
stockpiles can also be used when a government finds that metal prices are getting 
out of hand. Actions by a large producer-consumer like the United States in-
fluences world market prices. 
   For Japan the Persian Gulf region carried much weight in 1970, more than 
Anglo-America. But Japan is in an interesting geopolitical situation. In the 
perspective of a decade or two, three or four alternatives to the Persian Gulf 
may open up. The vast eastern regions of the Soviet Union contain much fossil 
fuel, primarily coal and natural gas but future finds of oil should not be left out. 
For this sparsely populated area Japan is a natural market. China is more and 
more coming into focus as a potential petroleum producer on a large scale. The 
domestic market for oil in China is tremendous but the country also needs foreign 
  4) de Vylder in his book on Chile during the Allende government shows that two arguments 
      were current in the domestic debate in the 1960s: the American copper corporations 
     paid too little for the metal and they did not push the Chilean production sufficiently to 
      hold the  country's share of  world production. 
      To prove the first point Chilean copper prices were compared with the spot prices at 
      the London Metal Exchange, which were higher. A more relevant comparison would
      have been prices paid for the much larger American production, which werelower. 
      The American corporations thus charged a higher price for low-cost Chilean copper 
     (average metal content in the  are some 3%) than for high-cost American copper(0,6% 
     metal content). United States paid more for imported copper than for domestic. 
     From 1968 the Chilean copper was sold on the London Metal Exchange and within a 
     few years Chilean prices coincided with LME-prices. It is doubtful if Chile in the
      long run  will be better off with the new arrangement. 
     To prove the second point Chilean economic writers quoted by de Vylder showed Chile's 
     percentage of world  producti  on at two points without mentioning that the decline 
     in Chile's percentage was a result of the rapid postwar expansion of the Sovietcopper 
     production. Chile in the  1950s and 60s had a much more rapid expansion than the 
      United State s and roughly the same as Zambia, its main competitor.
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exchange to pay for her imports of foreign technology. Japan is the logical market 
for Chinese oil exports. The shelf off the coast in East Asia has very promising 
structures for oil and natural gas, some rather close to Japan, but the geopolitical 
situation is by no means clear and it may take a long time before dividing lines 
have eventually been drawn. The strategy adopted in the North Sea was for neigh-
boring countries to first lease the tracts closest to the dividing line to tap pools 
stretching across the line. Indonesia is already an important supplier of oil to 
Japan and although a member of OPEC it is a  major alternative to the dominating 
Persian Gulf basket. Its production is likely to continue to expand. 
   The single most important supplier of minerals to Japan in 1970 was the United 
States with Canada as another major exporter. Both countries shipped a vast 
spectrum of minerals to Japan. By comparison Latin America and Africa were 
rather small suppliers. 
   In the western Pacific region, Australia with its large land surface and small 
population more and more emerges as the great storehouse of minerals for Japan, 
a great industrial nation with a small land base. In the Australian rush for 
minerals in the 1960s more high-grade iron  are was found than the world held 
in reserves in 1960. For bauxite the situation was similar. The list of minerals 
that Australia can supply is long. The rapid development of these mineral 
resources was made possible by Japanese long-term contracts. Consortia were 
formed with Australian, American or European and often also Japanese participa-
tion. These consortia had the financial, managerial and technical capacity to start 
mining in remote areas with a harsh climate and no infrastructure. 
Conclusion 
   International trade in minerals is primarily trade between DCs. The Marxist 
exploitation credo finds little support in statistical evidence. The opposite seems 
to be true: DCs are rich because they have understood how to utilize their natural 
resources. Through research and development they have learnt not only to use 
more and more minerals but also to use metals of lower grades and to get more 
energy out of every kilogram fuel. Inexhaustible sources of energy seem to be 
within reach: first fission energy with breeder reactors and later fusion energy. 
The DCs are developing techniques for utilizing the tremendous mineral resources 
on and in the sea floor and in sea water. The sea covers  71% of the surface of the 
earth. 
   For LDCs, who are poor partly because they have not had knowledge and 
technology to find and utilize their potential mineral resources, international raw 
material cartels may be counterproductive to their development plans. The
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land rent from a large mineral production may in the long run yield much more 
than the (temporary) monopoly tax plus land rent  from a decreasing production. 
It is unrealistic to assume that DCs will be willing permanently to pay higher 
prices for metals produced from high-grade ores in LDCs than for the same metals 
obtained from low-grade ores in DCs. 
   The creation of multi-state cartels invariably leads to confrontation and 
to protectionistic trade policies. When mining MCs become nationalized in LDCs 
other MCs that may be of even greater importance for the economic development 
and employment in such countries will stay out and look for more promising 
pastures in other DCs or  flock to LDCs with a friendly attitude to foreign in-
vestments, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and other countries 
in eastern Asia or Brazil in Latin America. 
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